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Abstract
The TEA Party initially formed in 2009 to protest excessive government spending
and skyrocketing debt. Very quickly their message caught on with many Americans
across the country. Local groups sprouted up across America without any hierarchical
organization directing their efforts. While some national TEA Party groups provide
training and funding to certain local organizations, many of these local groups remain
fiercely independent of any national affiliation. By examining their most basic political
tool, the protest, this paper explains why the TEA Party movement chose certain
congressional districts to hold its protests. It discovers that the TEA Party rationally
chose certain moderate to conservative districts in which to hold protests. They
represented the greatest opportunity for the TEA Party to successfully accomplish its
goals.
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Introduction
Tea parties are a recurring theme in American history. From Boston 1773, to
Washington DC 2010, tea parties have shaken the roots of government establishments.
The most recent American form of a tea party is a controversial, amorphous group of
local organizations devoted to the financial health of the United States. This modern day
TEA Party1 may be one of the most important political stories of 2010, earning a spot as a
runner-up in TIME Magazine’s prestigious Person of the Year Award("Person of the
Year 2010" 2010).
Before 2009, the tea party referred to the events in 1773 when Boston patriots
dressed as American Indians and threw tea off the British ships in Boston Harbor – a
symbolic beginning to the events of the American Revolution. The colonists were angry
over the imposition of a tea tax on British imported tea. They believed they were taxed
without their own representation. The modern TEA Party builds off the original
colonists’ anger against taxes and redefines the term in light of modern problems such
high income taxes and enormous deficits. They have achieved great influence in two
short years, yet they are a grassroots, unorganized collection of local groups. Did the
nature of the TEA Party with no central organization achieve such influence by following
the established principles for success as found in the literature of political science? Does
the TEA party rationally choose certain districts to effect the most change on the political
conversation? The answers are not simple, but a study of the most basic of events – the

1

TEA stands for Taxed Enough Already. Some news organizations such as The New
York Times have decided stylistically to only capitalize the first letter. I have decided
to capitalize all the letters because it is a acronym (Corbett, "The Public Editor," The
New York Times, October 9, 2010, 2010.).
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local protest- will provide evidence as to the true effect of the modern conservative TEA
Party on politics and political literature in the United States.
History of The TEA Party
The economy was collapsing in late 2007 and the banking industry was fighting
for its survival. Prior to the presidential election in 2008, Republicans and Democrats
joined together to pass the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which provided a
massive infusion of capital into the banking sector. Many Americans were angry at the
staggering sum of money given to the banks. Americans believed these banks were the
cause of the problems facing the country and were dismayed that the US government was
providing them direct funds without requiring meaningful oversight or the equivalent
assistance to the rest of the country.
After the Presidential Election in 2008, President Elect Barack Obama called for a
stimulus program to provide funding for “shovel ready” projects across the country and
to cut taxes to spur growth. The result was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), whose initial estimated price was $862 billion dollars. These two massive debt
financed spending programs, TARP and ARRA, quickly became unpopular. Rick
Santelli, a CNBC reporter, summed up Americans’ frustration with the perceived out of
control spending in a rant from the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. He called
for a Chicago Tea Party to protest the government “bailout” of homeowners’ mortgages.
He was upset that he would be forced to pay for other people’s excessive debt ("CNBC's
Rick Santelli's Chicago Tea Party" 2009). The idea of a “Tea Party” quickly caught on
with conservatives who were tired of excess government spending. Santelli provided a
large group of people with the spark necessary to get out on to the streets. In a scene
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reminiscent of Howard Beale in Network (“I’m mad as hell and not going to take this
anymore!”), Santelli found people’s anger and encouraged them to channel it
productively through protests against the government (Lumet 1976). From Santelli’s
video, an entire movement sprung up around the general ideas of limited government,
lower spending and fewer taxes. The first protests were quickly organized in 48 cities
across the country on February 27, 2009. In addition, groups sprung up across the
country in other small towns and cities to organize and promote their own local protests.
Most had their first protest on April 15th 2009, or tax day. Tax day is particularly
symbolic to the TEA Party because it is the day every year when federal income taxes are
due.
Since the TEA Party’s founding in February 2009, it has grown to consist of
hundreds of local organizations loosely connected with each other through national TEA
Party groups. Most of these organizations adhere to the same basic principles of fiscal
conservatism and tend to ignore social issues. The TEA Party may have received its
biggest boost from conservative television personalities that promote the events and
protests of the TEA party. Fox News was heavily criticized for encouraging participation
in the first round of protests by TEA party groups on April 15, 2009, or income tax day.
Several days throughout the year have become designated TEA Party protest days. July 4,
September 11/12, and April 15 are days for local groups to hold protests. Usually the
local groups invite conservative talk show hosts, politicians, and other local dignitaries to
their protests. Speakers at many of these protests talk about restoring government to its
original principles from the time of the writing of the Constitution. These speakers
advocate for more limited government, lowering of personal and corporate taxes and a
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balanced budget. Many advocate rebalancing the federal government against state
governments. In addition, they reserve some of their most heated rhetoric for criticism of
the policies of the Obama Administration.
Many participants of these TEA Parties like to distinguish themselves from the
Republican establishment. They do not want to be a political party, and see themselves as
more effective being outside the traditional establishment. Most believe that conservative
Republicans during the Bush Administration lost their focus. Tea Partiers saw
conservatives in Washington as out of control and questioned the large deficits in recent
years. During the 2010 primary cycle, many new candidates claiming to represent the
TEA Party challenged numerous incumbents and Republican Party favorites. The Tea
Parties continued to use their independent influence throughout the general election cycle
by helping many Republican candidates win against their Democratic opponents. On
November 3rd, both Republicans and Democrats credited the Tea Party with their
respective wins and defeats on Election Day.
It is important to remember that there is no definition of a TEA Party group. In
fact, there has been fighting amongst groups on a national level for the right to call
themselves the TEA Party. Some candidates are endorsed by certain local and national
TEA Parties, while other TEA Parties endorse their opponent. Many of these groups are
run from the grassroots level with little guidance from any organization above. Groups
can quickly form and dissipate in response to the needs of the community. Some groups
are affiliated with national organizations and have gone through the training workshops
of FreedomWorks or the TEA Party Express. The Washington Post, in an extensive
survey of local TEA party organizations, was able to contact and verify the existence of
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647 independent local groups. Many of these organizations were not affiliated with the
larger national organizations, and most had little money or organizing experience. Most
of the contacted groups (57%) reported that they wanted to remain independent of the
larger organizations. They believe remaining independent is the best way to get their
message of lower deficit spending and lower taxes across to politicians in their district.
The article also found many of these local groups were fairly small and had not held any
sort of rallies in the previous year. The article’s authors write, “The findings suggest the
breadth of the [TEA] party may be inflated” (Gardner 2010).
The first section of this paper will examine the current literature on the theory of
social movements including collective action theory, social movement theory and
political opportunity theory. I will also examine the efficacy of newspapers to examine
social movements. The next section of the paper will detail several specific hypotheses
about social movements and the reasons for their formation and lasting success. I will
then detail my methodology and its limitations when examining the question of the effect
of the TEA party. The third section will be an examination of the number of TEA Party
protests in a district versus a number of different factors. I will look at how these results
correlate to current theories regarding social movements. It will become clear that
political opportunity provides the best framework through which to examine the TEA
Party. In addition, the data presented should provide an endorsement of the political
opportunity theory. Finally, based on these studies it will be possible to make comments
on the future of the TEA party and where it can go from here.
This work differs dramatically from others in the rather large literature examining
protest movements. In many previous studies, authors have examined survey data or
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examined a movement from the national level. This is one of the first surveys to examine
protests that have occurred across the country by looking through local newspapers. In
addition, the TEA Party presents a unique opportunity to examine an unorganized group
of local organizations bonded together through similar goals and a name, but with little
operational interface. This paper will describe many of the current theories, and examine
how a grassroots organization with very little centralization still manages to allocate its
resources rationally to try and accomplish its goals.

Literature Review
Protests are a pillar of democracy. They provide an avenue to involve oneself in
the process of lawmaking between election cycles and without the need to travel
distances or pay money for the direct lobbying of lawmakers. Protests tend to signal the
desires of their participants. Several theories have been proposed as to why people have
an incentive to protest and how individuals end up protesting in the public square.
Viewing the TEA Party through the lens of these theories can help to understand the
reason the TEA Party held protests in certain districts across the country. In addition, it
shows that a grassroots organization like the TEA Party can still act rationally at a macro
level.

Collective Action Theory
The literature on protest movements begins in 1965 when Olson first proposed the
collective action theory. Olson (1971) noticed that a dominant theory of groups was that,
“groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their
common interest” (Olson 1971, 2). Yet, this posed a seeming contradiction with rational
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individualism. He realized that in large enough groups, a free-rider effect appeared.
Olson writes, “a lobby organization, or indeed a labor union or any other organization in
the interest of a large group of firms or workers in some industry, would get no
assistance from the rational, self interested individuals in that industry” (Olson 1971, 11,
italics in original). If a group is organizing a protest, there is little incentive for any one
individual member of the group to show up because all members of the group would
realize the same gains regardless of their attendance. Despite this paradox, Americans
have continued to attend protests. Olson attempts to explain this paradox by providing
exceptions for different actors such as labor unions and lobbying groups. He argues that
each provides a unique benefit that is not available to nonparticipants. These
organizations may be small enough that they can encourage their members to participate
in action.
Burstein and Sausner (2005) explain that since Olson revolutionized group theory,
two groups of scholars have explored the consequences of his theory. The first group
disagrees with Olson’s premise and does not believe in the theory of collective action.
They believe the free rider effect does not exist in a large social movement. The second
group uses the theory of collective action to explain why certain groups are immune from
the theory’s underpinning. Several examples such as, “if some potential participants have
incentives not available to everyone; if the cost of participation can be reduced; and if
people may win nonmaterial benefits whether or not they achieve their political goals”
may make collective action more likely (Burstein and Sausner 2005, 406). This group
believes that it is possible for a rational human to decide to attend a protest event if the
actual costs outweigh the benefits. They believe it is possible to lower the perceived costs
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of attendance or increase the benefit so that the rational individual will attend because the
benefits outweigh the costs. However, they still hold to the theory of collective action. If
the benefits are not increased or if the costs are not lowered, a rational human being will
probably not take part in a protest.
At its very basic level, the theory of collective action cannot explain the TEA
Party. Hundreds of thousands of supporters from across the country attend TEA Party
protest to rally against government expansion. Much of what they were protesting was
ideological: calling for lower taxes and less regulation. Many of the people protesting
probably would never see direct political results from their protests. However, hundreds
of groups sprung up across the country to organize hundreds of protests with hundreds of
thousands of attendees. In addition, there were clear goals to the movement. For instance,
in both primary and general elections, the TEA party challenged politicians, whom they
did not consider to be fiscally responsible. One indicator of a lack of fiscal responsibility
was a vote for either the Stimulus bill (ARRA) or the TARP Act. As Frome, who
analyzed several polls of TEA Party opinion in 2009 and early 2010, states, “the TEA
Party expresses unified opposition to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act…
and the ‘bailouts’ of floundering banks” (Frome 2010, 19). The TEA Party attempted to
influence the results of elections. Therefore, the TEA Party did have clear benefits in a
context of collective action. However, at an individual level, it is not clear if an individual
participant would be aware of these benefits or if these benefits would provide enough
incentive for the participant.
There has been some pushback to arguments advanced against the collective
action problem. One area of pushback is to the weight given to the free-rider effect.
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Lohmann (1993) provides a framework to counter the problem of the free-rider effect in
the literature. She argues that in democratic theory, a leader will change the status quo
based on the majority position. If a majority wishes to challenge the status quo, such as
high corporate tax rates, they will try to signal to the leader that the rates are too high by
some sort of political action, an example of which is mobilizing for protests. This
signaling, according to Lohmann, can be done through simply counting the size of a
protest movement and comparing that number to a fluctuating critical threshold set by
society at large. This threshold is an variable number that society believes constitutes a
large number. The number can vary if the protest is held in downtown Manhattan versus
a small town in the Mississippi delta region. Once a protest hits this threshold, the leaders
must take notice of the large protest.
She argues that leaders also sift through activist protest movements and moderate
protest movements. An impartial counting of a moderate protest can provide a signal to
the leader to change his or her ways on a particular issue. This eliminates much of the
free-rider problem because simply showing up is the most important aspect to a protest.
Individual and collective gain is provided by being a statistic, and by not showing up, an
individual is harming the chances of success. Therefore, an individual has a higher
individual benefit as well as collective benefit if he decides to attend because he will not
receive much of an individual benefit if he does not attend the rally. This information
about quantity is a useful tool for the individual to determine whether the potential
benefits outweigh the costs of political action. A leader then uses the information realized
by the number of those that attend a political action to make up his mind on the keeping
the status quo or changing policy. Showing up improves the chances of a rallies success
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by signaling to the leadership the size of those who wish for change. Lohmann believes
persuasion through signaling is the key effect of a protest.
One of the biggest controversies surrounding the TEA Party movement, setting
aside any differences over policy, is the counting of participants that attend their rallies.
These numbers are usually estimated by the police or newspapers, and are often used as a
measure of success. Many of the articles read for this study included crowd estimates
compared to a pre-protest estimate. These pre-event estimates could be found in official
documents such as an application to rally or in interviews with journalists. These
numbers were then compared in the articles written after each rally to assess the success
of the rally. Clearly, the number of participants in the rallies were related in judging the
success of the TEA Party. This provides a huge opening in eliminating the problem of
collective action for the TEA Party. While attending a protest might have had costs and
benefits, the problem of collective action might not exist for TEA Party rallies. The
individual cost and individual benefit seems to drive participation as opposed to the
group cost and group benefit.
Burstein and Sausner also question whether collective action to change policy
even exists for American society. They examined a study by McAdam and Su (2002) of
Vietnam protests to look for the number of protests that occurred. McAdam and Su
originally had examined these protests to study the influence of protests on policy
achievements. Burstein and Sausner, using McAdam and Su’s data, looked at the raw
numbers of protests to see if collective action to change policy really exists in the United
States. While there are some limitations to McAdam and Su’s survey as they only used
the New York Times to examine protests, Burstein and Sausner believed that in fact
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protest is an overblown phenomenon. They argue that at most in McAdam and Su’s data
90 events occurred in a single month. The average for a month was 4. They compared
this with the population of 200 million at the time. This lack of action made them
question whether collective action is even a problem. (Burstein and Sausner 2005, 409).
People might simply not protest enough for collective action to present a problem in
ascertaining individual motivation for protest. Instead, people may protest for different
reasons than policy change. If people participate in a rally once in awhile, they may find
more benefit through social benefits than in the actual outcome of the rally. It might be a
good way to meet new like-minded friends or simply to trade gossip with old friends.
Burstein and Sausner also compare the number of protests with other events such as
baseball games and concerts that routinely draw thousands. They try to argue that in
society, protests form a small part of everyday life. This is another reason why collective
action may not apply to the TEA Party. While the number of rallies may be higher than
discovered in McAdams and Su’s work, they still played a very small part in society. The
problem that individuals may not be motivated because benefits are spread across a wide
group of participants may be simply theoretical. Instead, individuals must protest because
there are simply not enough participants to make a difference in the first place.
Social Movement Theory
Social movement theory developed as a way to explain why certain social
movements gain traction over others. This is slightly different than collective action,
because collective action theory attempts to explain why participants are driven to action
in a wide variety of contexts. Social movement theory builds on collective action theory,
but only for social movements such as peace marches or environmental movements.
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Collective action covers more groups such as labor unions or business organizations that
have a larger monetary goal in mind for their protests.
Klandermans and Oegema (1987) write that there are four key aspects to a social
movement. The first, they argue, is forming mobilization potential. Each social
movement must find the potential members who would be willing to protest. They write
that this differs slightly from those who might benefit from the gains of the protest.
Sometimes the potential members willing to protest will be smaller than those who may
benefit from the protest. This may be due an inability to protest for geographic or
monetary reasons. The potential members of the TEA Party, by tapping into deficit fears,
were conservatives and libertarians from across the country. The second step is “forming
and motivating recruitment networks” (Klandermans and Oegema 1987, 519). Once a
group knows its target audience, it must reach out to potential members. This step can be
extremely difficult for grassroots organizations, but has gotten significantly with the use
of modern technologies such as Facebook and Twitter. After an organization reaches out
through any number of steps, it must convince and then motivate its potential member to
action. A potential member may be willing to participate if they understand the perceived
costs and benefits of such an action. It is important to note that it is the perceived costs
and benefits and not the actual costs and benefits. Based on the perceived incentives, one
may be willing to act in a situation. Klandermans and Oegema define the incentives as
either “soft (nonmaterial) or social, and hard (material) or nonsocial” (Klandermans and
Oegema 1987, 520). They write that soft incentives are extremely important to
motivating humans to act, while hard incentives have not had a truly demonstrable effect.
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The final piece of a social movement is eliminating or minimizing the barriers to
act. A rational person will act when the benefits outweigh the costs. A social movement
attempts to increase benefits while decreasing the costs of participating. The costs of
participating can include other activities that the person gives up as well as the physical
costs of getting to the rally. These can all be lowered with the help of the social
movement. The TEA Party helped lower much of the costs associated with participating
in a protest by keeping the rallies local and holding rallies in hundreds of towns across
the country. This made attending a rally far easier than had most of the rallies occurred in
Washington D.C.
Social movement theory incorporates these four aspects of protest to examine
how social movements gain traction in society. The TEA Party, as most social
movements, very much fit into these guidelines. They performed all these steps to
become an extremely successful social movement. There is mobilization potential in at
least a few of the Congressional districts in the United States. Conservative voters felt
that they needed a new movement to reinvigorate the Republican Party. The TEA Party
provided a public forum to organize disaffected conservative voters. The second aspect of
forming the networks to reach these potential members has been made extremely easy in
light of the Internet, Facebook, Twitter, and Fox News. The first three provide
individuals the ability to communicate to and organize large groups of people with the
single push of a button. Fox News, the conservative 24-hour news station, promoted the
TEA Parties during their television as both news stories and necessary commentary.
Finally, right-wing talk radio is particularly strong and was able to reach out to millions
of listeners across the country. The third aspect of social movements is to convince and
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motivate members to action. The TEA Party was able to describe the perspective benefits
of defeating opponents, lowering taxes, and decreasing the deficit. This message
combined with the feeling among many TEA Partiers that they were helping to “save”
America may have been enough to persuade them to action. Social movement theory
provides a fairly general theory about why a social movement gets started and eventually
able to sustain itself.
Political Opportunity Theory
Building on both collective action theory and social movement theory, political
opportunity theory has emerged as a controversial alternative. Political opportunity
theory incorporates politics into the possible motivations of political movements such as
the TEA Party. Meyer (2004) examines the two decades of literature on political
opportunity and attempts to create a framework from which to examine the interactions
between political movements and the world. Social movements do not operate in a
bubble, but usually form in response to external factors. Meyer writes that “the key
recognition in the political opportunity perspective is that activists’ prospects for
advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting influence are contextdependent” (Meyer 2004, 126). Political opportunity can be used to explain why a social
movement becomes successful. Meyer outlines his theory of political opportunity, which
he believes requires several underlying conditions. Meyer argues that “the presumption
underneath a political opportunity approach is that the development of movements
reflects, responds to, and sometimes alters the realities of politics and policy” (Meyer
2004, 139). It is based on the opportunity of a movement to gain traction in a society
because of a number of different factors. However, these factors are not defined and in
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many cases, issue specific. They do follow a general pattern of indicating a societal
openness to the particular issue motivated by a group. Meyer writes that it is these factors
which determine the “grievances around which activists mobilize, advantaging some
claims and disadvantaging other claims” (Meyer 2004, 128). These factors which
support action under political opportunity theory can be a closing off of traditional
avenues for grievance such as petition or lobbying capacity, which can lead activists to
protest. Or the factor could be the opening of institutions to new participants such as that
which occurred after the government protected African Americans following Brown v.
Board of Education. Another factor could be a change in government policy or a change
in the composition of the governing party. Once a factor is present, a group will decide it
may be necessary to protest. This aspect of political opportunity theory assumes that
some activists react rationally to societal cues. There is another group of political
opportunity theorists that believe activists are always attempting to mobilize. Once in
awhile, their motivation aligns with something in society that allows them to succeed.
However, for the most part these activists seem to fail the majority of the time. Mayer
attempts to reconcile both points of view by arguing “committed activists may always be
trying to mobilize on behalf of their causes, savvy ones adjust rhetoric, focus, and tactics
to respond to political circumstances” (Meyer 2004, 139).
The TEA Party probably consists of groups of savvy and committed activists who
were responding to problems with the two political parties. As partisanship increased in
Washington along with the deficit, the TEA party saw an opening for a social movement.
The environment in the United States, with the proliferation of Twitter and Facebook
allowed for groups to mobilize and organize more quickly than ever. Below, I will

Rudofsky | 20
examine whether the TEA Party in fact operated as a rational actor according to the
theory of political opportunity. In the TEA party’s case, a grassroots organization of
hundreds of different groups was able to mobilize at a national level and protest with
relative uniformly against policies that it opposed.
Finally, once a protest succeeds, the activists can influence the environment that
allowed for the protest in the first place. If the group is given an opening into the policy
making process, future protests lose much of their energy. They succeed at their goal so
further protest becomes unnecessary. As protests are institutionalized and brought within
the political process, they become less necessary and occur less often. Once the TEA
Parties began to run their own candidates, they held less protests and these protests were
less popular than the first round in 2009.
The Use of Newspapers in Examining Protests
One of the problems with learning about protest is the difficult nature in studying
different social movements. Sociologists and political scientists have had trouble
gathering either survey or protest data that allows them to answer questions posed by the
theories above. Many studies of protests in the last few decades, including some of those
already mentioned, have used newspapers to examine the protest movements. There have
been several studies on the efficacy of using newspapers to study social movements and
social protests. Earl et al. (2004) writes about the potential pitfalls of using newspaper
articles to learn more about a social movement. They conclude that bias can be
introduced when newspapers are the source of information. They label two types of bias,
selection bias and description bias. Selection bias occurs because newspapers choose
which stories to print. Some of these stories may not be the most newsworthy, or may be
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selected only because a large number of people attended an event. This may prevent a
scholar from learning about smaller or less important events. In addition, they believe
that newspapers may incorrectly report on an event, which leads to description bias.
Newspapers may mislead readers on the size of an event, where it was held, how
influential it seemed to be, and the overall message of an event. These authors provide a
framework to eliminate or mitigate these biases.
For selection bias, Earl et al. believes that institutionalized protests receive less
coverage than less institutionalized protests. Institutionalized protests are protests that
occur within a mainstream organization such as a political rally, a rally for the
environment sanctioned by major environmental groups, or a peace rally endorsed by
hundreds of politicians. The TEA Party probably falls into the less institutionalized
protest category simply based on the level of sustained news coverage over the year and
half study. In addition, they write that the best results occur by using national and local
newspapers to look at protests. Simply using more than one data source allows for the
best data. In my evaluation of TEA Party protests, I use one database online, which
searches thousands of local and national newspapers for my search terms. I used the
database in an attempt to eliminate as much selection bias as possible, because Earl et al.
write that local newspapers tend to have less of a selection bias of events. There are still
problems with using electronic sources. They write that “electronic searches may miss
events that are framed in unusual ways” (Earl et al. 2004, 75) This will be further
discussed below. The data collected; however, will show that a large database can be
assembled using an electronic search of 21 different states and their newspapers makes
the database statistically significant.
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Hypothesis
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares, “Congress shall
make no law… abridging the freedom of speech… or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble.” Americans at the time of the Revolution fought for their right to protest.
Today, many groups continue the tradition of holding protests to exercise their right to
criticize the government. Protests occur almost daily, even about the most trivial of
matters. Local and national TEA party groups are no exception. They hold protests
frequently. These protests serve as an effective method for organizations to get their
message to a broad group of interested individuals. Not only do passersby see the
organization protesting, but people can also join in with little cost to themselves. Protests
can be covered by news organization by both traditional and new media as a way to
disseminate the message far behind the local public square.
Examining these protests can give insight into why these certain protests
occurred where they did. The simple logistics of organizing protests have gotten easier
due to the Internet. On the other hand, actually getting people to give up a Saturday
afternoon is much tougher as there are many other avenues of entertainment that compete
for that person’s time. In today’s multimedia world, gathering people for a protest usually
involves people who are dedicated to the cause. These individuals must be motivated to
action to attend a protest. Observing TEA Party rallies across the United States can give a
unique insight into grassroots social movements.
The difficulty becomes trying to discover when and where a rally occurs and how
many people attended the rally. Many organizations tend to over exaggerate the number
of rallies they hold or the number of participants that attend each rally. By exaggerating,
the organization is trying to establish its legitimacy to new members and decision makers.
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This legitimacy is important because it determines if an organization will be taken
seriously. On the other hand, a third party source may not be available to verify protests
or rallies. However, news reports of rallies provide a good estimate of the number of
rallies in a Congressional district. They allow for a reasonably unbiased account of where
and when a rally occurred. While there may be selection bias or description bias, looking
at a large number of newspapers from local to statewide should help capture accurate data
on the number of events and their levels of participation in a district. There is simply no
way to ascertain every TEA Party rally in the country. Nonetheless, a search of multiple
newspapers seems to be the most effective method for discovering most, if not all, of the
rallies held across the country.
I must make several assumptions regarding my decision to only look at TEA
Party rallies that are reported in newspapers. The first assumption is that when a
newspaper reports on a rally, the rally was newsworthy. I am assuming this means the
rally had a large attendance or was fairly influential in the surrounding area. If the local
media does not cover a rally, I am assuming that the rally was not widely known in the
Congressional district. This helps to track the influence of the protests in the district. If a
rally is reported then people who were unable to attend may still learn about the rally.
This should increase the influence of the rally. Unfortunately, this also invites media bias.
Besides for selection bias and description bias, the recent trend in newspapers to
consolidate and close due to sagging readership has led to less reliable local newspapers.
In many rural districts, it may be harder to find records of TEA party rallies if there are
no newspapers in the area. In areas where liberal newspapers predominate, a TEA Party
protest may be less likely to be reported. While in conservative districts, newspapers may
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even cover the smallest rallies. In addition, some congressional districts may be covered
by newspapers that are too large to report on a small gathering of a few hundred people,
i.e. The New York Times in Manhattan.
With these concerns in mind, I will make several hypotheses:
At a macro level, the TEA Party acted rationally by investing its resources into districts
where it would receive the most gain.
Political opportunity theory would say that the TEA Party would invest its
resources in the congressional districts that present the most opportunity for it. This
becomes more complicated because there is no centralized organization to direct
resources into encouraging protests in a certain district or area of the country. Instead the
TEA Party is a grassroots organization that holds protests based on where local
organizers decide they want to hold a protest.
The TEA party consists of conservative minded people who can be found in
almost every congressional district in the United States. In 2008, Barack Obama swept
several Republican leaning districts, and moderate Democrats were able to ride the
enthusiasm of several key Democratic constituencies. In many of these swing districts,
Democrats voted at higher levels than Republicans. In the 2006 midterm Congressional
election, many Republican voters were dissatisfied with the policies of the Bush
Administration. For two consecutive congressional elections, therefore, Democrats held a
competitive edge based on enthusiasm. Democrats had won back the House of
Representatives by winning districts that had previously been represented by a
Republican. Many of these districts were center or center right districts. I predict that the
TEA party focused on these swing districts in addition to extremely conservative
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districts. The TEA party, according to political opportunity theory, should target areas
that are open to their protests, and where they have a chance to connect with the
population on a particular issue. From there, they need to have the possibility of some
success. One TEA Party priority was to win back the House of Representatives for
conservative Republican congress members. They felt these conservative congress
members would be more willing to advance their legislative priorities of cutting spending
and lowering taxes. Therefore, the biggest opportunity for the TEA Party would be to
select moderate districts with a representative that was more liberal than the voters of the
district.
I will use six variables to test the openness of particular districts to TEA Party
protests. These variables will be tested against the number of TEA Party events in
districts across 21 states. The most TEA Party protests should be held in the moderate to
conservative districts that are the most open to TEA Party protests.
a) The TEA Party held the most rallies in moderate to conservative districts based on a
PVI index.
One-way to measure a moderate district is to look at the Cook Partisan Voter
Index or (PVI)("Partisan Voting Index Districts of the 111th Congress"). The PVI is
compiled by examining the Presidential election results of the last several elections.
According to Cook, the PVI allows, “an objective measurement of each congressional
district that allows comparisons between states and districts, thereby making it relevant in
both mid-term and presidential election years” ("Introducing the Cook Political Reports
Partisan Voter Index (PVI) for the 111th Congress" 2009). The purpose is to accurately
measure how Democratic leaning or Republican leaning a district is compared to the rest
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of the country. Therefore, the moderate districts or districts with a low D(emocrat)+ or
R(epublican)+ rating should be the focus of the TEA Party. These are the swing districts.
These districts should be open to TEA Party protests for two reasons. The first is that
many were upset with the incumbents, and the TEA Party presented an independent
message. They were different from the two major parties and presented a new message to
moderates. The other reason is that in order for the TEA Party to create a more
sympathetic environment for their deficit message, they needed to appeal to moderate
districts that had voted for moderate to liberal members of Congress. The TEA Party
wanted to change the political balance in Washington and ensure their conservative
message would be taken seriously.
In addition, the TEA Party was formed by conservatives to protest for
conservative policies (Frome 2010). Therefore, I believe the TEA Party will also hold
protests in extremely conservative districts. However, these protests may have a different
goal in mind. They probably were to show support for their congress member. Even
congress members in fairly safe seats need to reflect the opinions of their constituents.
One way constituents can signal to their congressman their desires is through protest.
Either way, I believe the TEA Party will mainly focus on these two district types –
moderate districts to try to alter an election or policy vote, and conservative districts to
try to voice support for the elected officials. By studying the number of events in a
district by the PVI, I propose that there will be noticeably more protest events in the
moderate and extremely conservative districts or those between D+10 and R+10 and
those over R+20.
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b) The TEA Party held the most rallies in districts where the Representative was ranked
moderate to conservative by the National Journal Rankings.
The TEA Party was not only examining the district, but also the representative of
the district. While there should be a correlation between the representative of a district
and the PVI of a district, both can be studied. I predict very similar results when the
events in the district are examined by the National Journal Rankings. The National
Journal compiles these rankings every year. For the 2009 rankings, the last available
before the writing of this paper, the National Journal used 92 votes from the House of
Representatives. They then rate each vote as a more liberal or conservative vote and
weight each vote based on how likely a predictor that vote can be on a related subject
area (Cohen and Friel 2010). By looking at this data, the same conclusions should appear.
First, moderate Representatives, those that were ranked in the middle of the 435-sitting
congressman, should have their districts targeted by the TEA Party. Second, the extreme
conservatives, those ranked last on the liberal version of the rating system, should also
have seen many TEA Party events in their districts. Once again, the districts with
moderate to conservative members should be the most open to political protest from the
TEA Party.
c) TEA party groups were strongest in areas where their Representative voted for the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
The TEA Parties were founded as a nonpartisan group specifically in reaction to
the Stimulus Act and the TARP votes. Each of these pieces of legislation increased
government spending to levels that the TEA Party members believed were unacceptable.
Rick Santelli’s rant was over the TARP Act, and most people who strongly believe in the

Rudofsky | 28
TEA Party saw the Stimulus Act as another example of wasteful spending. It is likely that
there is a strong correlation between TEA party activities in districts where the
Representative voted for the Stimulus Act. TEA Parties in specific districts may have
started as a direct reaction to their Representative’s vote for the Stimulus Act. The TEA
Party groups wanted to make it known to their Representative that they were unwilling to
tolerate more government spending. However, the TEA Party, according to the previous
hypothesis should be heavily interested in conservative districts and not in liberal
districts. Representatives from liberal districts would be more likely to have voted for the
stimulus bill than conservatives. The bill passed with all Democratic votes (Making
Supplemental Appropriations For Fiscal Year Ending 2009: Roll Call Vote 70).
Therefore, these two hypotheses may seem to be in direct opposition to each other.
However, both would provide an opening for protests in their district. The TEA Parties
developed in response to the stimulus vote. It could be predicted that they would want to
protest against those that voted for the bill. It is also possible that the opening might be
there, but that there are simply not enough interested activists in the districts to take
advantage of the opening. Two conditions are necessary to fulfill the political theory, an
interested party and an opening in society. An affirmative vote on the stimulus bill may
provide one opening, but not enough to attract interested parties.
d) TEA Party groups were strongest in districts that voted for George Bush in 2004 and
then voted for Barack Obama in 2008.
Another predictor of a swing district is the presidential vote. This is especially
true of the 2004 and 2008 elections. During the 2004 election, President Bush won 51%
of the popular vote and 286 electoral votes ("CNN.com Election Results" 2004), and
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during the 2008 election, President Obama won 53% of the popular vote and 365
electoral votes ("CNN Election Center 2008" 2008). The TEA Party should be expected
to target the districts that changed their vote between 2004 and 2008. This could be
considered the definition of swing districts. While this data is included in the PVI index,
it looks specifically at the difference between these two elections rather than all five
presidential elections since 1992. The TEA Party therefore should be strongest and hold
the most rallies in these districts that voted for George Bush in 2004 and then voted for
Barack Obama in 2008. These districts provide the best chance to change the outcome of
future votes on important pieces of legislation. These swing districts are not heavily
gerrymandered towards one party or the other. In fact, they are probably some of the
most competitive districts in the country. These districts present the largest opening for
the TEA Party to be successful.
e) The TEA Party targeted districts where the margin of victory in the 2008
Congressional election was very low.
This is yet another way to examine the claim that the TEA Party would target the
most competitive districts. Another way to examine this is to look at the past results of
the congressional election. In 2008, Democrats may have won a seat by only a very small
margin due to the enthusiasm of liberal voters. These districts would be the perfect swing
districts for the Congressional elections. Occasionally, congressional elections and
presidential election results differ as to the party. The purpose of this hypothesis and the
next one is to ensure that the TEA Party acted to target congressional elections. Political
opportunity would assume that the TEA Party would look at the margin of victory to
determine where the country may be the most open towards organizing around a fairly
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conservative ideology. If the margin of victory is extremely large, than it means the
district is not very competitive. This could be accounted for by a variety of different
factors including a lack of political action in the district. Additionally, there would not be
a significant chance of the TEA Party changing the outcome of the election or a
congressional vote.
f) The number of TEA Party groups increased in a direct relationship with the
Republican share of the vote in the 2008 Congressional Election.
The TEA Party, because it is focusing on moderate to conservative districts,
should have held the most protests in the districts where the Republican earned a high
vote share (over 45%). In the liberal districts, as has been stated, the shares of the vote
given to the Republican candidate and the number of TEA Party protests should be low.
This is primarily due to the idea that a Republican candidate will probably not have a
high vote share in a district that is liberal. However, the opposite should hold true where
the Republican candidate should have a higher vote share in conservative districts. This
number correlates to the possible base of support for the TEA Party as it looks beyond
simple binaries like winning. Instead, it provides a measure of total support in a district.
This will help to examine whether there was a strong base of support for the TEA Party
prior to the movement’s founding.
g) TEA Party groups were strongest in districts that Cook Reports rated as competitive in
the 2010 election.
Every Congressional district is rated by Cook Reports to determine which seats
are the most competitive. They determine the most competitive seats and place them in
three levels of competitiveness for seats that are held by Democrats and three levels for

Rudofsky | 31
seats that are held by Republicans. The three levels are Likely Democrat, Lean Democrat,
Toss Up Democrat, with similar categories for Republicans. Like the previous
hypothesis, the TEA Party should target these districts because they are the most
competitive. Therefore, more events should be found within these six levels of
competitiveness than elsewhere. These districts should provide the most opportunity for
the TEA Party to affect elections or policies because they are the most competitive
districts in the country. Therefore, the TEA Party should have many protests in the most
competitive districts.
h) The TEA Party targeted Cook Reports’ competitive districts that were Toss Up
Democrat, Lean Democrat, and Likely Democrat.
The TEA Party was looking to remove most moderates from power, but they
especially disliked moderate Democrats who would vote against many of their top
priorities. These moderate Democrats should be centered in these extremely competitive
districts. In addition, if the TEA Party were to behave in a rational manner, they would
place their resources where they could promote their interests. These districts provide the
most opportunity for the TEA Party to eliminate moderate Democrats who may have
backed the health care law or the stimulus bill. Based on an assumption that they were
trying to effect the most change, the TEA Party should place most of their resources in
districts where they have a very real chance of electing a congress member that will
become reliable elected supporters of the TEA Party.

Research Design
All the hypotheses will be tested based on evidence gathered from newspapers
from around the country including local newspapers from many of the districts. I use the
database search engine Newsbank to examine newspapers by state. Newsbank is an
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enormous database over 3200 distinct sources across the United States. The Boolean
search term I use are TEA Party AND Rally, Rallies, Protest AND Date. These terms are
entered in the exact same order and spelled the exact same way for each search. Each
search is narrowed down based on the search engine’s list of newspapers in a particular
state. The purpose of the first term is to ensure the newspaper reporter or editor believed
he or she was covering a TEA Party event. They were eyewitnesses to the protest and
their description of the protest is important. The use of Rally, Rallies, and Protest hoped
to find the largest number of articles that reported on any sort of TEA Party event along
the definition below. These are the types of events that satisfied the conditions for being a
protest. There are hundreds of articles that fit these descriptions that could not be
considered TEA Party rallies. Unfortunately, there is simply no way to eliminate all
search error without going through every day of every newspaper, but using these search
terms and looking through newspapers from each state, I have attempted to eliminate
most of the potential errors. I chose the start date of April 1, 2009 and finished on
Election Day 2010 (November 2rd, 2010). I counted only rallies that began on April 10th,
2009, and ended with rallies that occurred on November 3rd, 2010. I choose April 10th as
the start date because the first round of TEA Parties in February 2009 occurred before the
stimulus bill was made law. I wanted to ensure I captured April 15th, 2009 and any in the
proceeding few days. April 15th, 2009 had the largest number of individual local TEA
Party rallies. In addition, I ended my search for protests at the election because much of
the efforts of the TEA party were aimed at affecting the results of the election. I found
TEA party rallies in 21 randomly picked states, which includes 148 Congressional seats. I
scanned every article that appeared for instances of a confirmed TEA Party rally by the
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newspaper. For the purposes of this paper, I defined a rally or protest as an event with
more than one person that occurred in a visible public space. I do not include meetings in
this definition of rally. A public meeting is a place for a discussion, while a rally is meant
to inform those around about the purpose of a group. In addition, I do not include
campaign events for a particular candidate unless the newspaper defined the rally as a
TEA Party rally to which a candidate was invited to attend. Finally, I included protests
outside official government events or against a public speaker such as when President
Obama speaks at a school. However, I did not include protestors who “crashed” a public
meeting such as voicing an opinion at a school board meeting. My attempt was to include
only protests that occurred in public from which there was an attempt to influence others.
My research includes announcements in the regular articles of the paper, but not letters to
the editor about upcoming TEA Parties in a particular location. I did not record events
that occurred without a specified location and events that occurred in out of state districts.
I included the date of the protests, the physical location, the amount of people recorded in
the protest, and the link to the online location of the article. I eventually discovered 1070
protests that occurred over the roughly year and a half studied. The states and number of
districts in the state are listed in Table 1.
Table 1- Randomly Selected States with Number of Congressional Districts in State
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
Maine
Maryland

# of Districts
7
1
8
4
7
5
25
2
5
2
8

STATE
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode island

# of Districts
15
9
1
3
2
3
29
5
5
2
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After data collection, I will use Microsoft Excel to create scatter plots and
histograms to examine the data in visual manner. In addition, I plan to use STATA to
examine correlations of the number of events in a district between affirmative stimulus
votes and negative stimulus votes, presidential winners, and competitive and
noncompetitive races.

Data
Across the different states there were 1070 distinct events recorded. A summary
of the data is recorded in Table 2 on a state-by-state basis. A further break down by
district can be located in Appendix I.
Table 2 – Number of Protest Events in Each State
STATE
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Idaho
Iowa
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode island

Number of Events
67
21
35
45
59
57
175
36
33
19
33
128
47
30
25
15
48
105
52
27
12

Number of Events/ Districts in State
9.57
21
4.38
11.25
8.43
11.4
7
18
6.6
9.5
4.13
8.53
5.22
30
8.33
7.5
16
3.62
10.4
5.4
6

The data was then compared to each of six different measures that would test my
hypotheses.
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Results
I first examined the relationship between the number of events in a district and the PVI of
the district. My hypothesis stated that there should be a larger number of events in
moderate to conservative districts. In Figure 1, the number of TEA Party protests is
graphed against the PVI. The conservative districts are given a positive PVI number. The
more liberal districts are given a negative PVI number. This graph shows a grouping of
TEA Party events in districts rated 0 to increasingly more conservative. In Figure 2, the
events in a district are grouped by PVI groups of 5. This shows, as well, that TEA Party
events occurred in moderate to more conservative districts. In addition, using the

Number of TEA Party Events in District
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statistics program STATA, there is a correlation of -0.4083 between PVI and events in a
district with a p value that is significant at the .01 level. These graphs show that the TEA
Party held events in moderate to conservative districts and that PVI is somewhat
correlated to an event. This validates my hypothesis.
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Average Number of TEA Party Events in
District

Figure 2 - Average Number of TEA
Party Events by PVI Index
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Next, I examined the events in a district by the National Journal Liberal ratings. In
Figure 3, a slightly different pattern emerges. In these graphs, the correlation between
Congressional rating and the number of events in their district is less strong. The
correlation is -.2598 with a p value of .0015. There is clear statistical significance, but the
correlation is weaker than for the PVI rankings. The histogram shows that most protests
occurred in the districts with a conservative member and a moderate member. The
histogram in Figure 4 is based on the National Journal Rankings with bins of 25 rankings.
Figure 5 provides the raw numbers as the National Journal rates them without comparing
them to other members of Congress. The most liberal are ranked 100, while the least
liberal are ranked 0. While the evidence is not as clear for this hypothesis, there is still
some correlation, albeit weak, that the liberal rating of a congressman was important in
where the most TEA party events were held.
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Average Number of TEA Party Events in District

Number of TEA Party Events in District

Figure 3- Number of TEA Party Events by
National Journal Liberal Congressional
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Figure 5 - of TEA Party Events by
National Journal Liberal Congressional
Rating
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The third hypothesis was whether a Congressman’s vote on the American Recovery and
Reinvestment act had any correlation with TEA Party events. The data, as outlined in
Table 3, is pretty clear that there is some correlation.
Table 3 – Average Number of Events, by Stimulus Vote
Stimulus Vote

Average Number of Events

No Vote

8.759
(6.67)
n = 58
Yes Vote
6.170
(5.94)
n = 88
Difference of
2.588***
Means
[1.055]
Note: Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses; standard error in brackets
***p < .001 for difference in average number of events in district (two-tailed t tests).

However, this is not the correlation that was assumed. Instead, more TEA Party
events were held in districts where the Congressman voted against the Stimulus Act. The
probability that the number of events in districts where the congress member voted
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against the Stimulus Act is higher than the number of events in districts where the
congress member voted for the Stimulus Act is .9923. A student’s t-test run on this data
confirms that the difference of the means is statistically significant in the 99th percentile.
It is clear that more TEA Party protests were held in districts where the
Congressman voted against the Stimulus Act. Congressmen from liberal districts were
more likely to have voted for the Democratic sponsored stimulus plan. As shown above,
the TEA Party held fewer events in these liberal districts anyways. Therefore, it is not
surprising that there were fewer events in districts where the Congressman voted for the
Stimulus Act then against it.
The fourth hypothesis was regarding presidential elections. I predicted that the
districts that voted for George W. Bush and then Barack Obama would have the most
TEA Party events. Instead, it appears that districts that voted solidly Republican held the
most events. The results are displayed in Table 4. There were substantially more events in
districts that voted for at least one Republican candidate for President. Districts that voted
for Bush in 2004 and McCain in 2008 had statistically significantly more events than
districts that voted for John Kerry in 2004 or Barack Obama in 2008. This once again
suggests that the TEA Party focused on moderate to conservative districts. They did not
hold many events in districts that voted for the Democrat, which holds consistent with the
previous data.
Voting for George Bush in the 2004 Presidential election seems to be an excellent
indicator of where the TEA Party would hold protests. The results are significant at a
99% confidence interval with the probability that the number of events in Bush districts is
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greater than the number of districts in Kerry districts is equal to almost 1.0000. The same
strong relationship can be found in the Presidential Election in 2008.
Table 4 – Average Number of Events, by 2004 Presidential Election Vote and 2008
Presidential Election Vote
Average Number of Events
2004 Presidential
Election

Bush
Kerry

Difference
2008 Presidential
Election

9.083
(6.94)
n = 84
4.781
(4.40)
n = 64
4.302***
[.993]

McCain

9.375
(7.27)
n = 64
Obama
5.583
(4.96)
n = 84
3.792***
Difference
[1.007]
Note: Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses; standard error in brackets
***p < .001 for difference in average number of events in district within presidential election
year (two-tailed t tests)

Table 5 – Average Number of Events by Presidential Election Winner in 2004 and 2008
Presidential Winner of
Average Number of Events Number of Districts
District in 2004 and 2008
Both Republican
9.375
64
Both Democrat
4.78125
64
Bush/Obama
8.15
20
Kerry/McCain
N/A
0

In addition, I ran three t-tests examining the possible combinations of Presidential
winners from 2004 and 2008. These combinations were Bush/McCain, Bush/Obama, and
Kerry/Obama because no districts in the sample voted for Kerry in 2004 and then
McCain in 2008. My hypothesis was that the largest number of events would be seen in
Bush/Obama districts. The following t-tests show that the difference in the average
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number of events in Bush/Obama districts and Bush/McCain was not statistically
significant. However, the difference between Bush/McCain districts and Kerry/Obama
districts was statistically significant. That means the TEA Party held more protests in
districts that voted for the Republican candidate twice over those districts that voted for
the Democratic candidate. Finally, the difference in Bush/Obama districts and
Kerry/Obama districts was also statistically significant. Once again this confirms the data
from above that the TEA Parties were held in moderate to conservative districts. The
most important variable seems to be a vote for the Republican candidate once.
Table 6 – Average Number of Events, by Combined Presidential Vote from 2004 and
2008 Presidential Election
Average Number of Events
Bush in 2004

Bush/McCain
Bush/Obama

Difference
Republican in Both
2004 and 2008

Bush/McCain
Kerry/Obama
Difference

Obama in 2008

Bush/Obama

9.375
(7.274)
n = 64
8.15
(5.851)
n = 20
1.225
[1.785]
9.375
(7.274)
n = 64
4.781
(4.309)
n =64
4.594***
[1.063]

8.15
(5.851)
n = 20
4.781
Kerry/Obama
(4.309)
n =64
3.369***
Difference
[1.223]
Note: Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses; standard error in brackets
***p < .001 for difference in average number of events in district within presidential election
year (two-tailed t tests)
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The above chart also provides evidence that voting for Bush in 2004 may have
been the most important presidential variable in deciding where the most votes would
occur. This may follow the popular narrative that conservatives were enthusiastic with
George Bush, but much less enthusiastic with the candidacies of John McCain and Sarah
Palin. These conservatives then rose up to protest after the 2008 election by joining the
TEA Party. Conservatives saw an opening in society after they saw excessive
government spending and debt. They had previously sat out the 2008 election or did not
campaign as they had for George Bush. The TEA Party and the excessive spending gave
them an avenue to take out their frustrations with the liberal policies of the Obama
Administration.
The fifth hypothesis is that more TEA Parties should be held in districts where the
margin of victory in the 2008 congressional election was low. Figure 6 is a scatter plot of
the events in a district. There is a clear downward trend that seems to indicate that there
are more TEA Party protests in districts were the margin of victory, for either side, was
low. This seems to add to the growing evidence that the TEA Party focused on the
competitive districts. Figure 7 depicts these results with bins of five. The histogram
seems to indicate that the highest average was the most competitive districts. However,
there seemed to be two bars that do not fit the trend. These are the 31-35 and 41-45 bars.
The large number of events in Montana may explain the 31-35 bar. Montana has only one
Congressional district, and it did not see a very competitive election in 2008. There were
31-recorded events in Montana and the margin of victory was 31.72. Montana is a
conservative state where it is expected to be a lot of protests. In addition, Representative
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Denny Rehberg, a Republican, voted against the Stimulus Act and is ranked 324 in the
National Journal Liberal rankings. This one outlier helps to explain the tall bar that
doesn’t follow the trend. The 41-45 bar is less explainable. The bar has 9 districts from
across the country. The districts voted 5-4 Bush over Kerry and the same for Obama. It is
likely an outlier cannot explain this high average number of events. Finally, the
correlation between the number of events and margin of victory in the 2008
Congressional election is -.2625 with a p value of .0013. Therefore, once again there is a
weak correlation between the number of events and the margin of victory for a
Congressman.

Number of TEA Party Events in District

Figure 6 - Number of Events by Margin of
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The sixth hypothesis or Hypothesis F, states that the number of TEA Party events
in a district should increase with the vote share of the Republican candidate during the
2008 election. The data describes a weak to moderate correlation value of .3417 with a p
value of 0.0000. This data is displayed below in Figure 8 and Figure 9. While there is no
clear statistical evidence, both the graph and chart seem to indicate that there is a possible
trend in which the moderate and most conservative districts see the most amount of
activity by the TEA Party. One particularly interesting observation is the large amount of
activity around in the 41-50% vote share range for Republicans and the drop off for the
51-55% bar. Congressional elections are not always won with an outright majority so
having fewer than 50% of the vote does not mean the Republican lost.
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Figure 8 - Number of Events by Republican
Share of the Vote in 2008 Elections (Not
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The seventh hypothesis is that the TEA Party was strongest in the competitive
districts based on the Cook Ratings of the districts for the 2010 election. Cook Ratings
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examines all 435 districts and determines those districts in which it believes the
incumbent or if an open seat, the party of the previous incumbent, will lose the seat to the
opposite party. In my sample, 52 races were considered competitive and 96 were not
considered competitive. The data is displayed in Table 7. The competitive races have
more average events per district than the noncompetitive races. The differences in the
means in significant at the 90th percentile. Therefore, the TEA Party probably held more
protests in the most competitive districts than the least competitive districts.
Table 7 – Average Number of Events, by Cook Ratings of Congressional Races
Cook Rating
Average Number of Events
Competitive
Races
Non
Competitive
Races
Difference of
Means
Note: Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses; standard error in brackets
*p < .1 for difference in average number of events in district (two-tailed t tests).

8.365
(6.59)
n = 52
6.604
(6.13)
n = 96
1.761*
[1.085]

The final hypothesis is that the TEA Party held more protests in districts that
Cook Reports labeled likely, lean or toss up Democrat for the 2010 Congressional
Elections. This looks beyond simply competitive races and examines the previous
incumbent to see if the congressional seat will change parties. While the number of
districts examined was smaller in this sample size, some interesting observations can be
seen in Table 13 and in Figure 10. For instance, there seems to be a There are a total of
52 districts that I examined that Cook Reports considered competitive districts. Because
of the nature of the 2010 election, only one district in the United States was considered a
Republican Toss Up. However, this district fell outside the survey.
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Table 8 – Average
ge Number of Events by Cook Ratings of Competitive Congressional
Districts
Average Number of Events
Number of Districts
Cook Ratings of
Congressional Races
Likely Democrat
5.2
5
Lean Democrat
7.384615385
13
Democrat Toss Up
9.777777778
18
Republican Toss Up
N/A
0
Lean Republican
8
11
Likely Republican
9.8
5

Average Number of TEA Party Events

Figure 10-- Average Number of Events
by Cook Ratings Competitive District
Ratings
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This disproves my original hypothesis. Instead the TEA Party held rallies in the
Democrat Toss Up, Lean Republican and Likely Republican categories. The focus for the
TEA Party seemed to be on districts that Republicans needed to ensure did not switch
sides. In addition, the TEA Party did hold more races in the
he most competitive “Democrat
Toss Up” districts. The
he average number of TEA Party rallies in th
thee Democrat Toss Up,
Lean Republican and Likely Republican were all much higher than the average number
of rallies across all districts at 7.22
7.22. This indicates that the TEA Party held the many
rallies in moderate to conservative competitive districts. Interestingly,
estingly, there were more
rallies in Democratic districts, but the data is not statistically significant (Table 8).
8) There
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simply may not be enough districts to evaluate the validity that there were more rallies in
either Democratic or Republican competitive districts.
Table 8 – Average Number of Events, by Democratic Competitive Races vs. Republican
Competitive Races, Toss Up Races vs. Less Competitive Races, and 4 Most Competitive
Districts vs. Likely Democratic and Likely Republican Districts
Average Number of Events
Competitive Races

Democratic
Republican

Difference
2 Most Competitive

Toss Up
Less
Competitive
Difference

8.563
(7.536)
n = 16
8.278
(6.246)
n = 36
2.847
[2.001]
9.278
(6.958)
n = 18
7.618
(6.37)
n = 34
2.160
[1.917]

8.571
(1.09)
n = 42
7.5
“Likely” Races
(4.35)
n = 10
1.071
Difference
[2.339]
Note: Entries are means; standard deviations are in parentheses; standard error in brackets
Two –tailed t tests show no confidence levels
4 Most Competitive

4 Most
Competitive

I next examined the Democrat Toss Up category versus the other categories.
There were very few Republican Toss Up districts because the Republicans were
expected to do extremely strong in 2010. The only one district that fit this description was
not included in the initial data collected. I wanted to see if the TEA Party focused the
most strongly on the most competitive districts. The data, while not statistically
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significant at any confidence level, may show that the TEA Party held more protests in
the most competitive districts. However, the sample size may simply be too small to
prove anything. The results of the test can also been seen in Table 8.
The last test I ran with these Cook Competitive Ratings was to look at the middle
four categories versus the two least competitive categories. The middle categories were
toss up and lean districts while the least competitive were likely districts. This figure
once again is not statistically significant. The results can be seen in Table 8. However, the
raw numbers seem to indicate that the TEA Party held the most rallies in the most
competitive districts. Once again, this lack of statistically significance may be caused by
the small sample size.

Conclusion
The results of these six variables provide a more general view of the TEA Party
protests. They also confirm the overall hypothesis that the TEA Party was strongest in
places that were the most open to their protests. These were in districts that were
moderate to conservative based on PVI and had a moderate to conservative
Representative. The TEA Party did not target districts where the Representative voted for
the Stimulus Act. However, districts that were competitive based on ratings from Cook
Ratings, the margin of victory and the percentage of the Republican vote were all targets
of the TEA Party. Finally, districts that voted for a Republican candidate for President
once in the past two election cycles had more TEA Party events than other districts.
These all seem to confirm that the TEA Party was strongest in the districts that were most
politically open to these conservative protests. Politically open means the districts
provided the most opportunity for the TEA Party to organize protests and the most
opportunity to accomplish its goals. Both competitive districts and extremely
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conservative districts were particularly open to the TEA Party. The competitive districts
provided the TEA Party with the best opportunity to effect change through challenging
the incumbent congressman or placing pressure on a policy vote. The most conservative
districts provided the TEA Party with the ability to rally its most ardent supporters. Since
the message of the TEA Party already resonated with many in the most conservative
districts, organizing protests would be significantly easier. The first possible reason was
that they wanted to support their congress member for supporting policies that fit within
the goals of the TEA Party. A second reason is that the TEA Party members could have
been trying to signal to their conservative congress members that they wanted to ensure
he or she continued to support conservative policies. Many of the most conservative
congress members took part in providing earmarks to their districts. This was a hated
policy of the TEA Party so they protested and tried to prevent conservative members
from continuing to secure earmarks. The other reason the TEA Party protested in the
most conservative districts was to make the national presence more widespread. It
allowed some of its most hardcore supporters to take part in TEA Party rallies without
having to travel far. This minimizes the cost to participate and increases the number of
participants. The signal to national leaders becomes amplified by holding rallies in both
moderate and conservative districts. The TEA Party acted rationally by using its
resources to target these politically open districts. Yet, because the TEA Party is a
decentralized organization of local groups that they acted rationally is truly remarkable.
Even at the local level, TEA Party organizations only formed where there was local
interest as would be expected by political opportunity theory. The TEA Party was fairly
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efficient and did not waste its resources in districts where it may not have had much
chance for success.
As the TEA Party grew, they gained influence in the political process. Politicians
began to listen to their concerns and meet with leaders of the TEA Party. Republicans
from across the country wanted to speak at their events. As this occurred, candidates from
various TEA Party groups announced their candidacy for local positions such as mayor
and sheriff and national positions as well. They became more and more institutionalized.
The TEA Party, while remaining independent of the traditional Republican Party, was
brought into the national political conversation. As this institutionalization occurred, TEA
Party protests decreased in attendance and size. The number of protests, according to my
data, held in 2009 from April 10 to December 31st, a total of eight months, was 618
protests or 77.25 protests a month. The number of protests held in 2010 from January 1st
to November 2nd, a total of 10 months, was 452 protests or 45.2 protests per month. The
TEA Party slowed down in intensity and the media began to provide them less coverage.
Political opportunity theory, according to Meyer (2004), predicted this decrease in
activity as the protests became institutionalized. The TEA Party earned a seat in the
policy making process and no longer needed protests to garner attention. They won their
protest battle to take part in the conversation. Deficit reeducated has become a major
issue in the United States possibly due to the efforts of the TEA Party. More research
needs to be performed on the influence of the TEA Party. However, this paper answered
the question of where the TEA Party mobilized and why they mobilized in those districts.
It also provides further evidence that political opportunity theory can help to explain why
and where protest movements are successful.
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Appendix I
List of Districts and Number Events in Each District
District

Number of Events
Alabama

AL 1
AL 2
AL 3
AL 4
AL 5
AL 6
AL 7

23
18
4
10
6
5
1
Alaska

AK 1

21
Arizona

AZ 1
AZ 2
AZ 3
AZ 4
AZ 5
AZ 6
AZ 7
AZ 8

5
3
0
3
2
4
11
7
Arkansas

AR 1
AR 2
AR 3
AR 4

7
15
17
6
Colorado

CO 1
CO 2
CO 3
CO 4
CO 5
CO 6
CO 7

13
1
23
14
7
1
0
Connecticut

CT 1
CT 2
CT 3
CT 4
CT 5

10
16
11
9
11
Florida

FL 1
FL 2
FL 3
FL 4
FL 5

12
8
10
1
14
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District

Number of Events

FL 6
FL 7
FL 8
FL 9
FL 10
FL 11
FL 12
FL 13
FL 14
FL 15
FL 16
FL 17
FL 18
FL 19
FL 20
FL 21
FL 22
FL 23
FL 24
FL 25

9
10
12
2
1
3
3
14
18
9
21
3
2
0
7
2
5
8
0
1
Idaho

ID 1
ID 2

20
16
Iowa

IA 1
IA 2
IA 3
IA 4
IA 5

16
12
3
1
1
Maine

ME 1
ME 2

12
7
Maryland

MD 1
MD 2
MD 3
MD 4
MD 5
MD 6
MD 7
MD 8

11
3
4
0
0
11
4
0
Michigan

MI 1
MI 2
MI 3
MI 4
MI 5

8
14
7
12
7
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District
MI 6
MI 7
MI 8
MI 9
MI 10
MI 11
MI 12
MI 13
MI 14
MI 15

Number of Events
13
17
10
18
4
7
4
2
0
5
Missouri

MO 1
MO 2
MO 3
MO 4
MO 5
MO 6
MO 7
MO 8
MO 9

7
9
3
6
7
0
5
1
9
Montana

MT 1

30
Nebraska

NE 1
NE 2
NE 3

7
7
11
New Hampshire

NH 1
NH 2

9
6
New Mexico

NM 1
NM 2
NM 3

6
31
11
New York

NY 1
NY 2
NY 3
NY 4
NY 5
NY 6
NY 7
NY 8
NY 9
NY 10
NY 11
NY 12
NY 13

5
1
6
1
3
0
2
5
0
0
0
0
2
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District
NY 14
NY 15
NY 16
NY 17
NY 18
NY 19
NY 20
NY 21
NY 22
NY 23
NY 24
NY 25
NY 26
NY 27
NY 28
NY 29

Number of Events
0
0
0
0
2
1
4
8
5
10
20
8
3
8
2
9
Oklahoma

OK 1
OK 2
OK 3
OK 4
OK 5

10
14
4
7
17
Oregon

OR 1
OR 2
OR 3
OR 4
OR 5

2
13
3
6
3
Rhode Island

RI 1
RI 2

2
10
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